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THE WICKED WITCH IS ALMOST DEAD:
BUCK v. BELL AND THE STERILIZATION
OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS

Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. *
and
Marcia PearceBurgdorf **
INTRODUCTION

Judgment at Nuremberg 1 concerned the criminal trial of a former
German judge who, under Hitler's Third Reich, had ordered involuntary sexual sterilization operations to be performed upon Jewish men
and women. In a famous scene from that screenplay and movie, the
defense counsel, Rolfe, cross-examines a German law professor, Dr.
Wieck, in regard to the legality of such practices:
Rolfe
(continuing) Dr. Wieck, you referred to "novel National
Socialist measures introduced, among them sexual sterilization." Dr. Wieck, are you aware that this was not invented
by National Socialism, but had been advanced for years before as a weapon in dealing with the mentally incompetent
and the criminal.
Dr. Wieck
Yes. I am aware of that.
Rolfe
Are you aware that it has advocates among leading citizens
in many other countries?
Dr. Wieck
I am not an expert on such laws.
Rolfe
(crisply) Then permit me to read one to you.
Rolfe signals the Clerk in the dock to bring him a book. The
Clerk comes forward and hands it to him.
Rolfe
(continuing) This is a High Court opinion upholding such
laws in existence in another country. "We have seen more
• Director of Training and Technical Assistance of the Developmental Disabilities
Law Project, University of Maryland; Co-Chairman of the Mental Retardation and
the Handicapped Committee of the American Bar Association, Section of Family
Law; A.B., 1970, J.D., 1973, University of Notre Dame.
•*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland; Director of the Developmental Disabilities Law Project; Consultant to the President's Committee on Mental
Retardation and to the White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals; B.A.,
1969, Manhattanville College; J.D., 1972, University of Notre Dame.
1. A. MANN, JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (1961).
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TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol 50

than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange, indeed, if it could
not call upon those who already sapped the strength of the
State, for these lesser sacrifices, in order to prevent our being
swamped by incompetence. It is better for all the world, if,
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime
or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
their propagation by medical means in the first place. Three
generations of imbeciles are enough." Do you recognize it
now, Dr. Wieck?
Dr. Wieck
(with emphatic distaste) No, Sir, I don't.
Rolfe
(smiles a little) Actually, there is no particular reason why
you should, since the opinion upholds the sterilization law in
the State of Virginia, in the United States, and was written
and delivered by that great American jurist, Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.2
The quoted case is Buck v. Bell,' a 1927 Supreme Court decision
permitting the forced sterilization of a woman named Carrie Buck.
Aside from its affinity to the philosophical premises underlying Nazi
atrocities,4 Buck v. Bell has proven to be an embarrassing example of
bad law in a number of other ways. Both the factual 5 and constitutional ' bases of the decision have proven to be inaccurate in light of
modem scientific and jurisprudential knowledge. The decision has
spawned several lower court opinions which, in seeking to apply its
principles, have resulted in holdings that are manifestly unreasonable
and unjust." The decision has also invited numerous and often contrived attempts to distinguish or otherwise sidestep its holding 8 and
has engendered a situation in which the respective rights and liabilities
of the state and of doctors, judges, health and welfare personnel, and
mentally and physically disabled individuals themselves, with regard to
2. Id. at 36-37.
3. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Although Mann takes a few slight liberties with Justice
Holmes' language, the quotation is essentially a verbatim reproduction of a portion
of the Court's opinion in the case. Id. at 207.
4. The common basis of American sterilization statutes and Nazi practices has

been noted elsewhere. E.g., Kindregan, Sixty Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: "Three Generations of Imbeciles" and the Constitution of the United States,
43 CHL-KENT L REv. 123, 142-43 (1966); O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization,
of t,1ae Brave New
45 Gao. L.J. 20. 31. 36-37 (1956); Viiknwich, The D,.'.i..
World-Legal, Ethical and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. IL... I FoRum 189,
190, 201.
5. See pp. 1006-08 infra.
6. See pp. 1009-11 infra.

7. See pp. 1013-22 infra.
8. See pp. 1022-23 infra.
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voluntary and involuntary sterilization procedures, have become generally obscured.9
The purpose of this article is to assess the continuing viability of
the principles espoused in Buck v. Bell by examining its ruling, its
sources and defects, the cases which have purported to follow it, and
those which have limited or distinguished it.
I.

SOURCES AND BACKGROUND OF THE

Buck v. Bell

DECISION

Like Hitler's concepts of the master race and Aryan superiority,:"
American sterilization laws had their origin in the science of eugenics,
the discipline which deals with the improvement of hereditary qualities.I ' The term "eugenics," which is derived from the Greek word
meaning "good birth," was coined in the 1880's by Sir Francis
Galton, who defined it as "the study of agencies under social control
that may improve or impair . . . future generations either physically

or mentally." 12 The concept of selective breeding to improve the human
race had been proposed as early as Plato's REPUBLIC and has been advocated by numerous social philosophers at various times in history."
The supporters of human hereditary improvement were further
bolstered in the middle of the nineteenth century by the work of
Charles Darwin and Gregor Mendel regarding evolution and
heredity.' 4
The Social Darwinism of the last decades of the nineteenth century
gave rise to a eugenics movement which reached its peak in the United
States around the 1920's,15 but which has persisted in recent times.
The movement was marked by the flourishing of a belief that the
prevalence of mental and physical disabilities was the root of almost all
social problems, and by a fear that the occurrence of such disabilities
was increasing rapidly in modern civilization." The spread of such
ideas was fueled by notable studies such as those of the family trees of
the Jukes "rand the Kallikaks 18 which revealed generation after gen9. See pp. 1023-25 infra.
10. W. SrRm,, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 81, 86-89 (1960).

11. Vukowich, supra note 4, at 189.
12. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer, 27 OHIO ST.
L.J. 591, 591 (1966) (quoting A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AmERICA 357-58
(2d ed. 1949)) ; Vukowich, supra note 4, at 192.
13. Vukowich, supra note 4, at 192.
14. Id.; Note, Human Sterilization, 35 Iowa L. REv. 251, 252 (1950).
15. Vukowich, supra note 4, at 189.
16. E.g., W. WOLFENSBERGER, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF OUR INSTITUTIONAL
MODELS 33-39 (1975).

17. tR DUGDALE, THE JUKES (1877).

1& H.

GODDARD, THE KALLIKAK FAMILy (1912).
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eration of defective, degenerate, and criminal persons.' 9 Acceptance
of the necessity for scientific control of human heredity was widespread,
and many thinkers warned that the spreading of handicapping conditions through heredity was the single most important problem facing
American society. 20 The tenor of such outcries was epitomized in the
language of a law review note which called for a sterilization statute
in the state of Kentucky:
Since time immemorial, the criminal and defective have
Strong, intelligent, useful
been the "cancer of society."
families are becoming smaller and smaller; while irresponsible, diseased, defective families are becoming larger. The
result can only be race degeneration. To prevent this race
suicide we must prevent the socially inadequate persons from
propagating their kind, i.e., the feebleminded, epileptic, insane, criminal, diseased, and others. 2'
As an outgrowth of such sentiments, the eugenics movement generated various proposals for dealing with the ostensible problem of the
propagation of degeneracy. These proposed solutions included eutha2
nasia,22 prohibitions on marriage of defective persons, 3 outlawing
24
sexual intercourse with defective persons, segregation of defective
19. Note, The Individual and the Involuntary Sterilization Laws, 1966, 31 ALB.
L. REv. 97, 103 (1967). "The rapid evolution of twentieth century science has
virtually reduced these theories to folklore. The Jukes and the Kallikaks, in retrospect, have turned out more culturally and socially bankrupt than inherently defective."
Id.
20. W. WOLFENSBERGE, supra note 16, at 34.
21. Note, A Sterilization Statute for Kentucky, 23 Ky. L.J. 168, 168 (1934).
The author goes on to declare that "[t]he United States was the pioneer in the
movement for sterilization, and today is considered the foremost champion and advocate of the cause in the world." Id. at 169. Among the countries that the author
heralds as following America's lead in the field of sterilization is Germany. Id.
22. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343
F. Supp. 279, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (quoting testimony of Dr. I. Goldberg);
W. WOLFENSBERGER, supra note 16, at 37, 38.
23. W. WOLFENSBERGER, supra note 16, at 39-40; Vukowich, supra note 4, at
214-16. A national marriage law to prohibit marriages of mentally retarded and
insane persons was proposed in 1897 and received wide support. W. WOLFENSBFRGER,
supra note 16, at 40. A number of individual states passed restrictive marriage

statutes, and many such laws are still in effect today. Burgdorf & Burgdorf,
A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as

"Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15

SANTA

CLAA

LAW.

855,

861 nn.42-44 (1975).
24. W. WOLPENSBERGER, supra note 16, at 40. As an example of such measures,
Wolfensberger cites a Connecticut bill passed in 1895:
Every man who shall carnally know any female under the age of forty-five
years who is epileptic. imbecile; feeb!e-minded or a pauper, shaii be imprisoned
in the State prison not less than three years. Every man who is epileptic
who shall carnally know any female under the age of forty-five years, and
every female under the age of forty-five years who shall consent to be
carnally known by any man who is epileptic, imbecile or feeble-minded, shall
be imprisoned in the State prison not less than three years.
Id. (quoting 1895 Conn. Pub. Acts 667). This statute was in effect, with some
modifications, until repealed by 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts, ch. 828, § 214.
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persons, 2 5 and compulsory sterilization. In considering many such
proposals in its 1912 report, the Eugenics Section of the American
[Cattle] Breeders Association, which later became the American
Eugenics Society and played a major role in directing the course of
eugenic propaganda in the United States, concluded that only two solutions were practical: sterilization procedures and segregation of those
defective persons capable of reproduction. 8
Sterilization for eugenic purposes only became practically feasible
at the end of the nineteenth century. Prior to the 1890's, the only
surgical method available for producing sterility was castration, 27 a
procedure which was usually considered too radical because it was
medically dangerous, caused undesirable changes in secondary sexual
characteristics, and was widely regarded as morally unacceptable .2 s In
the middle of the 1890's, F. Hoyt Pilcher, Superintendent of the Winfield Kansas State Home for the Feebleminded, castrated forty-four
boys and fourteen girls, but adverse public sentiment soon caused a
cessation of this activity.29 Near the end of the nineteenth century,
however, Dr. Harry C. Sharpe of the Indiana State Reformatory developed a relatively simple method for the sterilization of males called
vasectomy. 80 At about the same time, French and Swiss doctors perfected the now-standard method of sterilizing females, salpingectomythe cutting or removal of the fallopian tubes." Eugenics advocates
were quick to take advantage of this new technology and a number of
physicians began to perform involuntary sterilization operations notwithstanding the fact that they had no legal authority to do so. Dr.
Sharpe reportedly put his innovative surgery into practice by performing sterilizations on some six or seven hundred boys at the Indiana
reformatory.82 Similarly, superintendents of institutions in several
states apparently engaged in secret sterilizations of mentally retarded
people. 8
The history of legislation dealing with eugenic sterilizations began
in 1897 when a bill authorizing such operations was introduced in the
25. W. WOLFENSBERGER, supra note 16, at 41-53; Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra
note 23, at 887-88.
26. W.

WOLFENSBERGER,

supra note 16, at 39.

27. Castration is used here in its broad sense to include sterilization of females
by removal of the ovaries-spaying-as well as removal of the testicles of malesgelding.
28. Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF.
L. REv. 917, 920 (1974) ; O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 20.
29. Ferster, supra note 12, at 592.

30. O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 20.
31. Id.
32. Ferster, supra note 12, at 592.
33. Id.
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Michigan legislature.8 4 It has been suggested that the Michigan bill
failed to pass because forced sterilization for eugenic purposes was a
concept alien to American legal ideals."8 Eight years later, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a sterilization statute, which was vetoed
by the Governor."6 In 1907, however, Indiana, the home state of Dr.
Sharpe, enacted the nation's first sterilization law. 7 The Indiana
statute applied to inmates of state institutions who were confirmed
criminals, idiots, imbeciles, or rapists.38 By 1910 Washington, California, and Connecticut had followed Indiana's lead and enacted sterilization measures.3 9 The next decade witnessed the passage of sterilization statutes in fourteen additional states and by 1930 the total number
of such statutes had swelled to twenty-eight.4" In 1922 eugenicists
published a Model Eugenic Sterilization Law which proposed to eliminate through sterilization a broad range of defects: the law provided
for sterilization of persons who were feeble-minded, insane, criminalistic, epileptic, inebriate, diseased, blind, deaf, deformed, and de41

pendent.

However, the legislative surge to authorize eugenic sterilizations
was frustrated by the courts. Prior to 1925, the year in which the
Supreme Court of Virginia made its ruling in Buck v. Bell,42 all eugenic
sterilization laws which had reached the courts had been declared unconstitutional " as cruel and unusual punishment," violations of due
34. Id. at 593.
35. O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 22.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 22 & n.17 (citing 1907 Ind. Acts ch. 215).
38. Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 526, 131 N.E. 212, 212 (1921)
Ind. Acts ch. 215).
39. O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 22.

(quoting 1907

40. Id.
41. A full description of these categories of persons includes:
(1) Feeble-minded; (2) Insane (including the psychopathic); (3) Criminalistic (including the delinquent and wayward) ; (4) Epileptic; (5) Inebriate
(including drug-habitues) ; (6) Diseased (including the tuberculous, the
syphilitics, the leprous, and others with chronic, infectious and legally
segregable diseases) ; (7) Blind (including those with seriously impaired
vision) ; (8) Deaf (including those with seriously impaired hearing) ; (9)
Deformed (including the crippled) ; and (10) Dependent (including orphans,
ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps and paupers).
Ferster, supra note 12, at 618 (quoting J. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERIIZATION
THE UNITED STATES

IN

446-47 (1922)) ; Kindregan, supra note 4, at 123.

42. 143 Va. 310, 130 S.E. 516 (1925)43. Ferster, supra note 12, at 593. Note, supra note 14, at 252. In the same
year as the Virginia court's decision in Buck v. Bell, the Michigan Supreme Court
upheld its sterilization statute in Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409,
204 N.W. 140 (1925).
44. Mickle v. Henricks, 262 F. 687, 690-91 (D. Nev. 1918); Davis v. Berry,
216 F. 413, 416-17 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
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process,4 bills of attainder, "' or deprivations of equal protection of the
laws.47 Even when not nullified for constitutional infirmities, sterilization laws frequently suffered from halfhearted implementation.4" Until
Buck v. Bell reversed the trend, the combination of judicial invalidations and lack of enforcement appeared to have placed eugenic sterilization statutes on the verge of extinction.49 This rejection of sterilization laws reflected the legal climate which existed when Carrie Buck
became the subject of proceedings seeking to sterilize her.
Carrie Buck was committed to the Virginia State Colony for
Epileptics and Feeble-Minded on January 23, 1924.5o On September
10, 1924, the superintendent of the colony presented his petition to the
colony's special board of directors, pursuant to Virginia law,"' praying
45. In re Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 547, 162 So. 123, 128 (1935) ;
Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 528, 131 N.E. 2, 2 (1921). See Davis v. Berry,
216 F. 413, 418 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
46. Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 419 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
47. Haynes v. Lapeer Cir. Judge, 201 Mich. 138, 145, 166 N.W. 938, 941 (1918);
Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 55, 88 A. 963, 966-67 (1913) ; Osborn v.
Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 35, 169 N.Y.S. 638, 644 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 185 App. Div.
902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1918).
48. As early as 1916, Law Professor Edwin Roulette Keedy observed:
[O]ur Legislatures enact statutes without considering the question of whether
they can be enforced. A notable instance of this is found in the recent laws
for the sterilization of defectives and criminals. A popular theory was seized
upon by enthusiasts and made the basis for legislative proposals, which
became law in many states. The theory is now to a large extent discredited,
and the laws are not being enforced.
Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 444, 204 N.W. 140, 152 (1925)
(Wiest, J., dissenting) (quoting Prof. Keedy).
49. One commentator noted the disuse and demise of sterilization laws in the
United States at that time. E. HOAG & E. WILLIAMS, CRIME, ABNORMAL MINDS,
AND THE LAW 31 (1923), quoted in Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409,
440, 204 N.W. 140, 150 (1925) (Wiest, J., dissenting).
50. Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 313, 130 S.E. 516, 517 (1925).
51. The Virginia Sterilization Act, 1924 Va. Acts 569-71 (repealed 1968),
provided:
Whereas, both the health of the individual patient and the welfare of society
may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives
under careful safeguard and by competent and conscientious authority, and
Whereas, such sterilization may be effected in males by the operation of
vasectomy and in females by the operation of salpingectomy, both of which
said operations may be performed without serious pain or substantial danger
to the life of the patient, and
Whereas, the Commonwealth has in custodial care and is supporting in
various State institutions many defective persons who if now discharged or
paroled would likely become by the propagation of their kind a menace to
society but who if incapable of procreating might properly and safely be discharged or paroled and become self-supporting with benefit both to themselves
and to society, and
Whereas, human experience has demonstrated that heredity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, epilepsy and
crime, now, therefore
1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That whenever the
superintendent of the Western State Hospital, or of the Eastern State
Hospital, or of the Southwestern State Hospital, or of the Central State
Hospital, or of the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-Minded, shall be
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for an order that Carrie be sexually sterilized by salpingectomy. A
hearing was held by the special board of directors and the order prayed
for was entered. An appeal was then taken by Carrie, through her
state appointed guardian, to the Circuit Court of Amherst County.
After trial, the court entered judgment upholding the sterilization
order.52
According to the county circuit court's findings of fact, Carrie
was seventeen years old at the time of her commitment to the colony,
and she was the daughter of a mentally retarded woman who had
previously been a resident of the same institution. Prior to her commitment, Carrie had given birth to an illegitimate daughter whom the
court described as "of defective mentality." Thus, the court found
that Carrie satisfied the statutory prerequisites for eugenic sterilization 5
The decision of the circuit court approving the salpingectomy was
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia on the grounds
that it did not provide due process of law, imposed a cruel and unusual
punishment, and was a denial of equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Virginia and United States Constitutions. The high court
of Virginia dealt with each of these challenges and found all three to be
without merit. The court reasoned that due process was not violated
of opinion that it is for the best interests of the patients and of society that
any inmate of the nstitution under his care should be sexually sterilized, such
superintendent is hereby authorized to perform, or cause to be performed by
some capable physician or surgeon, the operation of sterilization on any such
patient confined in such institution afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity
that are recurrent, idiocy, imbecility, feeble-mindedness or epilepsy; provided
that such superintendent shall have first complied with the requirements of
this act.
2. Such superintendent shall first present to the special board of directors of
his hospital or colony a petition stating the facts of the case and the grounds
of his opinion, verified by his affidavit to the best of his knowledge and belief,
and praying that an order may be entered by said board requiring him to
perform or to have performed by some competent physician to be designated
by him in his said petition or by said board in its orders upon the inmate of
his institution named in such petition, the operation of vasectomy if upon a
male and of salpingectomy if upon a female.
The said 'special board may deny the prayer of the said petition or if the
said special board shall find that the said inmate is insane, idiotic, imbecile,
feeble-minded or epileptic, and by the laws of heredity is the probable
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted, that the
said inmate may be sexually sterilized without detriment to his or her general
health, and that the welfare of the inmate and of society will be promoted
by such sterilization, the said special board may order the said superintendent to perform or to have performed by some competent physic.'an to be
ni-r..ed
in such oi der upon the said inmate, after not less than thirty days
from the date of such order, the operation of vasectomy if a male or of
salpingectomy if a female; provided that nothing in this act shall be construed
to authorize the operation of castration nor the removal of sound organs
from the body.
52. 143 Va. at 313, 130 S.E. at 517.
53. Id. Regarding the inaccuracy of the factual findings, see pp. 1006-08 infra.
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because the statutory scheme for authorizing sterilizations contained
sufficient procedural safeguards,54 and that the statute could not impose
cruel and unusual punishment because it was not a penal statute. The
court indicated that, in any event, the operation "is harmless and 100
percent safe." "
The equal protection claim elicited greater consideration by the
court before it was ultimately rejected. Relying upon Jacobson v.
8 which found that statutes providing for compulsory
Massachusetts,"
vaccination do not violate equal protection even though they only apply
to school children, the court held that measures affecting the public
health and safety as exercises of the police power of a state must be
given great deference under the equal protection clause.57 In response
to the contention that the statute engendered unequal treatment because
it authorized sterilizations only for persons committed to state institutions and not for all feeble-minded persons, the court declared that the
sterilization law had not divided one natural class into two classes to
be treated differently, but rather, two natural classes had preexisted the
passage of the sterilization act, thereby negating the act as the source
of any classification.5" Furthermore, the court added that two distinct
classes do not really exist because a feeble-minded person on the outside can, by the process of commitment, become a member of the class
of inmates and, thereafter, be subjected to sterilization also.59
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the plaintiffs did
not press the cruel and unusual punishment contention but relied instead upon the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection
challenges to the Virginia statute. In arguments before the Court,
counsel for the plaintiff made it clear that the due process claim was
one of substance and not merely a question of procedural rights, "for
form of the procedure cannot convert the process used into due process
of law, if the result is to illegally deprive a citizen of some constitutional
right." 6 In this context, it was argued that involuntary sterilization
of Carrie Buck would violate "her constitutional right of bodily in54. Id. at 317-18, 130 S.E. at 518-19.
55. Id. at 318, 130 S.E. at 519.
56. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
57. 143 Va. at 320-21, 130 S.E. at 519-20.
58. Id. at 321, 130 S.E. at 520. The real question for equal protection purposes
is not whether the classifications had preexisted the legislation, but whether the
different treatment of the two classes was justified by the purpose of the legislation.
For example, a class of persons with red hair preexists the enactment of any legislation, but a law identifying only red headed people for any penalty or benefit will
surely be vulnerable to an equal protection attack since the classification, persons
with red hair, has no relevance to legitimate legislative purposes.

59. Id.
60. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 201 (1927).
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tegrity" 61 or, more specifically, "[t]he inherent right of mankind to
go through life without mutilation of organs of generation." 62 In
addition to these substantive due process claims, plaintiff's counsel
reiterated the equal protection contention argued below-that the
sterilization statute had arbitrarily bisected a natural class, providing
differential treatment to the two dissevered factions.6" The argument
for the plaintiff closed with a ringing warning of the dangers of allowing state and medical personnel to possess inordinate power: a warning
which stressed the potentially limitless bounds of state power to eliminate through surgical sterilization those citizens classified as undesirable.64
The argument before the United States Supreme Court on behalf
of the defendant in Buck v. Bell in large measure restated the theories
relied upon by the high court of Virginia; characterization of the
sterilization statute as an exercise of the police power and its similarity
to compulsory vaccination laws. Additionally, counsel for the defendant pointed out that Virginia already deprived the feeble-minded
of their liberty through the commitment process and argued that the
sterilization operation is simply a prerequisite for restoration of liberty
through release from the institution. Counsel further noted that other
persons could obtain sterilization operations through exercising their
voluntary choice and, therefore, contended that there must be a method
for allowing incompetent persons, who are not legally capable of making the decision for themselves, to be sterilized.6 5 In response to the
equal protection challenges to the sterilization law, the defense argued
that the statute, based upon a reasonable classification, must be upheld.66
In support of the rationality of the classification, counsel pointed to its
use in other legislation, notably the Virginia law prohibiting marriage
with feeble-minded inmates of state institutions and heavily penal61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 202.
Id.
The Court, in quoting from the plaintiff's argument, stated:
If this Act be a valid enactment, then the limits of the power of the State
(which in the end is nothing more than the faction in control of the government) to rid itself of those citizens deemed undesirable according to its
standards, by means of surgical sterilization, have not been set. We will
have "established in the State the science of medicine and a corresponding
system of judicature." A reign of doctors will be inaugurated and in the
name of science new classes will be adcd, ever, iaces may be brought within
the scope of such regulation, and the worst forms of tyranny practiced.
In the place of the constitutional government of the fathers we shall have
set up Plato's Republic.
Id. at 202-03.
65. Id. at 203-04.
66. Id. at 204.
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izing the consummation of any such marriage. 7 Similar measures in
other states prohibiting the marriages of mentally retarded and epileptic
people were also noted in support of the contention that such restrictions were reasonable.6"
II.

THE DECISION

OF THE UNITED STATES

SUPREME

COURT

Buck v. Bell was argued before the Supreme Court on April 22,
1927. Ten days later, the Court issued its formal opinion. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes' majority opinion was a relatively short one,
comprising less than three and one-half pages, of which approximately
half was devoted to recounting the findings of facts of the lower courts.
Discussion of the constitutional issues was, therefore, somewhat
cursory.
Initially, Justice Holmes described the procedures step by step
which must be followed under Virginia law to authorize a sterilization
and then concluded that the existence of such procedures removed any
doubt that Carrie Buck was afforded procedural due process.69 The
heart of the decision, however, was the two concluding paragraphs,
which in rejecting the substantive attack on the Virginia law contained
a number of the most famous and infamous examples of judicial
grandiloquence:
The judgment finds the facts that have been recited and that
Carrie Buck "is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that she may be sexually
sterilized without detriment to her general health and that her
welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization," and thereupon makes the order. . . . We have seen
more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not
call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for
these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting
to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle
that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the Fallopian tubes..
Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.
But, it is said, . . . [t]his reasoning . . . fails when it is
confined to the small number who are in the institutions
named and is not applied to the multitudes outside.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 204-05.

69. Id. at 206-07. Justice Butler dissented without opinion.
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But the answer is that the law does all that is needed when
it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within
the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines0 all similarly
7
situated so far and so fast as its means allow.

The Supreme Court's holding in Buck v. Bell has been widely and
severely criticized. 7 ' One commentator declared that "[t]he opinion
is noteworthy for the boldness with which Justice Holmes dispenses
with rules of logic and in short, pithy sentences agrees to the subordination of human rights to the supposed expediency of a long range
racial improvement." 12 Another critic has characterized the holding
as a "fallacious absurdity" 73 while still another commented that "the
philosophy of government implied in the opinion is inconsistent with
and dangerous to our American heritage." 14 The decision has been
attacked as to the accuracy of its facts, the validity of its scientific
underpinnings, the applicability of analogies on which it places heavy
reliance, the suitability of the constitutional analysis it employs, and
the legitimacy of the philosophical principles upon which it is based.
There is general agreement that Justice Holmes was incorrect in
his presumptions of fact concerning Carrie Buck. 7' His phrase "three
generations of imbeciles" is based upon the supposition that Carrie's
mother and Carrie's infant daughter were both imbeciles. Subsequent
investigation has revealed, however, that neither the mother nor Carrie's
child were, in fact, imbeciles. A sociologist who delved into the evidence concerning Carrie Buck's mother reported that she was only
mildly mentally retarded which, under the terminology employed in the
1920's, would have qualified her, at worst, as a moron and not an
imbecile.7 6 Moreover, it was reported that Carrie's baby, the supposed
third generation imbecile, was not mentally retarded at all. The
daughter was only one month old at the time she was cavalierly labeled
mentally defective by a Red Cross nurse. The child died in 1932 of
measles, but by that time she had completed the second grade of school
70. Id. at 207-08 (citation omitted).
71. E.g., Ferster, supra note 12, at 617; Gest, Eugenic Sterilization: Justice

Holmes v. Natural Law, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 306 (1950); Kindregan, supra note 4, at
134-35, 143; Murdock, supra note 28, at 921-22; O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at

29-32; Note, supra note 19, at 102.
72. Gest, supra note 71, at 306.

73. Kindregan, jupra jiuic 4, at 143.
74. O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 32.
75. See, e.g., Kindregan, supra note 4, at 133 n.52; Murdock, supra note 28, at
921; O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 31-32.
76. Coogan, Eugenic Sterilization, 77 CATH. WORLD 45 (1953). Imbecile is the
archaic term roughly equivalent to what is now classified as moderately mentally
retarded.
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where she had demonstrated her mental normality and, indeed, was
77
reported to be very bright.

Not only was Justice Holmes wrong about the specific facts concerning Carrie Buck, but it has become increasingly apparent that his
opinion, replete with the tenets of eugenics,78 reflected erroneous scientific theories.79 The eugenics movement began to dissipate after the
1920's, and most of the premises upon which the movement was based
have since been repudiated. Even as the Buck v. Bell proceedings were
winding their way through the courts, a warning was being sounded
that eugenic theories were not on sound scientific footing."' From the
early 1930's onward, biologists and researchers began to retreat from
the sweeping generalizations about heredity which had prevailed in the
first three decades of the twentieth century. 8' In 1936 the American
Neurological Association issued a report which criticized the overwhelming emphasis being given to heredity as a cause of mental retardation, mental illness, epilepsy, pauperism, and other disabilities.8 2
The report concluded that environmental factors were at least as potent
as genetic factors in causing these handicaps and that there was no
evidence of any increase in such conditions or of any biological deterioration of the human race. Thus, the Association asserted that
under the present state of knowledge concerning heredity, no compulsory sterilization programs were justified.83 In 1937, the American
Medical Association echoed this view, finding little scientific basis for
limiting conception for eugenic reasons.8 4
The volume of scientific criticism of eugenic theory increased
steadily in subsequent years, until even the most enthusiastic eugenicists
77. Kindregan, supra note 4, at 133 n.52.
78. Justice Holmes' opinion, couched in the vernacular of the eugenics movement,
employs such notions as "socially inadequate offspring," the need "to prevent our
being swamped with incompetence," and the idea that "[i]t is better for all the
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind." 274 U.S. at 207.
79. The Virginia sterilization statute at issue in the case was explicitly based on
the "laws of heredity" and extolled the importance of heredity in "the transmission
of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, epilepsy, and crime." 1924 Va. Acts 569. See note 51
supra.
80. "We know very little about human heredity as yet, though nowhere are rasher
statements made about it than in America; and many of the deeds done there in the
name of eugenics are about as much justified by science as were the proceedings of
the Inquisition by the Gospels." Haldane, Biology Moulding the Future, FORUM
(March 1925), quoted in Smith v. Wayne, Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 444-45, 204
N.W. 140, 152 (1925) (Wiest, J., dissenting).
81. Kindregan, supra note 4, at 134.
82. Ferster, supra note 12, at 602-03 (citing CoMm!. AM. NEUROLOGICAL Ass'N,
EUGENICAL STERMIZATION (1936)) ; Kindregan, supra note 4, at 134.
83. Ferster, supra note 12, at 602-03.
84. Id. at 603 (citing COMM. TO STUDy CONTRACFrv PRACricEs & RELATED
PROBLEMS, AmECAN MErIcAL ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 54 (May 1937)).
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were forced to reduce the magnitude of their earlier claims.
Modern
methodology punctured some of the older studies, such as those of the
Jukes 8" and the Kallikaks, s7 which had seemed to indicate that social
and physical ills ran in families because of "bad hereditary strains." "8
It became increasingly apparent that the laws of heredity developed by
Mendel in his experimentation with peas could not be applied carte
blanche in the context of human characteristics.8 9 Contrary to the
beliefs of eugenics zealots, two mentally retarded parents often bear
children of normal intelligence.9 " Theories that criminality, epilepsy,
insanity, and other traits are hereditary were likewise refuted by
modern scientific evidence."1 According to the present trend in scientific
thought, 2 such traits are the result of an interaction between heredity
and environment, with the latter probably being more influential. 93
Thus modern science reveals a dearth of scientific basis for the eugenic
sterilization laws " and, in turn, for Justice Holmes' eugenics based
analysis.
In addition to its factual and scientific inadequacies, the Buck v.
Bell opinion has been criticized for its reliance upon certain logically
inapposite analogies. 8 Justice Holmes' comparison to sacrificing lives
in military service " has been vigorously condemned. The wartime
service is justifiable by the threat to the safety of citizens,97 an immediate, urgent threat dissimilar to cases of eugenic sterilization.9" What85. Kindregan, supra note 4, at 135.
86. See note 17 supra.
87. See note 18 supra.
88. O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 37.
89. Note, supra note 14, at 254.
90. The findings of some studies indicate that mental retardation is not hereditary.
It has been estimated that 89% of all mentally retarded children come from "normal"
parentage. Kindregan, supra note 4, at 139. Another study of two institutions for
mentally retarded children found that 15% of the children were born of parents one
or both of whom were retarded; thus, 85% of that sample were born of "normal"
parents. Murdock, supra note 28, at 926 n.56 (citing Gamble, What Proportion of
Mental Deficiency Is Preventable by Sterilization?, 57 Am. J. MENTAL DEaic. 123,
124 (1952)).
91. Note, supra note 14, at 254.
92. No attempt will be made here to examine the current status of scientific
knowledge in regard to the complexities of genetic theory. An explanation of concepts such as genotype, homozygotes and heterozygotes, mutations, the unit particle
rule, dominant and recessive genes, and genetic load is beyond the scope of this
article. Moreover, such matters have been discussed in some depth by legal cominentators elsewhere. E.g., Cook, Eugenics or Euthenics, 37 ILl.. L. R v. 287, 291332 (1943) ; Murdock, supra note 28, at 924-28; Vukowich. supra note 4, at 191-91.
93. Cook, Y-upra note 92, at 298-311, 313-32; Note, supra note 14, at 254.
94. Note, supra note 19, at 102.
95. E.g., Ferster, supra note 12, at 617; Gest, supra note 71, at 307-09; O'Hara &
Sanks, supra note 4, at 29-30.
96. 274 U.S. at 207.
97. Gest, supra note 71, at 307.
98. O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 30.

1977]

STERILIZATION OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS

ever emotional appeal Justice Holmes' formulation may have, there
seems to be little logical connection between the authority of the United
States to enter into wars and engage in conscription of military personnel, and the authority of a state to perform involuntary eugenic sterilization.
As in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in
Buck v. Bell,99 Justice Holmes also drew a parallel between compulsory
sterilization laws and statutes providing for compulsory smallpox vaccinations. 00 This unlikely comparison has been the subject of wide
and sharp criticism.1 0 ' A number of significant differences between
vaccination and sterilization make the attempted analogy somewhat
strained. The medical procedures involved-simple innoculation with
vaccine versus anesthesia, abdominal incision, and cutting and tying of
Fallopian tubes-are drastically dissimilar. Furthermore, while both
vaccination and sterilization were allegedly designed to preserve public
health, vaccination is substantially less intrusive of the rights of the
individual than is sterilization."0 2 Moreover, the effectiveness of smallpox immunization has been effectively demonstrated by the experience
of many generations,"0 3 while the effectiveness of eugenic sterilization
in eliminating the unfit and preventing race degeneration is largely
conjectural."a° In the final analysis, Justice Holmes' analogy to vaccination procedures, like his earlier comparison to conscripted soldiers
in wartime, is inappropriate to determine the propriety or impropriety
of compulsory eugenic sterilization.
One of the most basic problems with the Buck v. Bell decision is
its superficial constitutional analysis. In describing and resolving the
substantive due process and equal protection issues in only two paragraphs, Justice Holmes obviously did not devote much attention to
examining the fine points of fourteenth amendment analysis. Indeed,
he is brutally derisive in dismissing the plaintiff's equal protection claim
as an argument of last resort. 0 5 However, the equal protection argument dismissed by Justice Holmes had actually prevailed in three state
99. 143 Va. at 320, 130 S.E. at 519.
100. 274 U.S. at 207.
101. Ferster, supra note 12, at 617; Gest, supra note 71, at 308; O'Hara & Sanks,
supra note 4, at 30.

102. "A health regulation such as vaccination operates first in preserving the body
of the individual from disease, and benefits the general public health because of its
beneficent effect on each individual. Sterilization on the other hand is a direct attack
on the liberty of the individual." Gest, supra note 71, at 308.
103. O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 30 n.68 (quoting W. MONTAVON, EUGENIC
STaILIZATION IN THE LAWS OF THE STATES 24 (1930)).
104. See notes 78-94 supra and accompanying text.
105. 274 U.S. at 208.
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supreme courts prior to the decision in Buck v. Bell."° A more
fundamental criticism of the constitutional analysis arises in light of
later fourteenth amendment decisions demonstrating the inadequacy
of the constitutional standards applied by Justice Holmes. The rational
basis has ceased to be the only test for equal protection arguments.
Today, strict scrutiny and even a balancing approach may be used.
Similarly, due process analysis may require a more comprehensive
0T
review.
In addition to formulating new tests for fourteenth amendment
analysis in the years since Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court has enunciated a constitutional right to privacy, °8 which in Skinner v. Oklahoma,"°9 a sterilization case, resulted in a declaration that the right to
procreate is a fundamental constitutional right. The Skinner case involved an equal protection challenge to a statute, based upon a fine legal
distinction authorizing the involuntary sterilization of habitual criminals
including convicted larcenists but not embezzlers.1 10 In finding the
statute violative of equal protection, the Court discussed the constitutional stature of the interests at stake:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of
the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.
106. Haynes v. Lapeer, 201 Mich. 138, 168 N.W. 930 (1918); Smith v. Board of
Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913) ; Osborn v. Thomson, 185 App. Div. 902,
171 N.Y.S. 1094, aff'g, In re Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (1918).
107. Dean Charles Murdock has described this problem:
Although Buck has never been explicitly overruled, the Court's reasoning
would almost certainly be inadequate today. Its holding rests on a standard
of review, rational basis, which affords challenged legislation an almost
insurmountable presumption of validity. At one time nearly the exclusive
test in equal protection cases, rational basis is today only one of several
standards used by the Court in deciding fourteenth amendment issues. Since
1942 equal protection analysis has included a "strict scrutiny" test reserved
for classifications affecting "fundamental interests" or involving "suspect
criteria." Additionally, the Court has most recently employed a "meansfocused" review or balancing approach in a few cases.
Due process analysis today has similar diversity. Where legislation
touches upon fundamental interests the statute must not be unnecessarily
broad, nor effect an irrebuttable presumption, and must use the least burdensome means available. As will be seen, the right to procreate is among the
fundamental interests that trigger more active review under modern interpretations of the equal protection and due process clauses. In short, the
rational basis reasoning of Buck, sufficient in 1926, would be anachronistic
today.
Murdock, supra note 28, at 921-22 (footnotes omitted).
108. This right to privacy embraces such matters as abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) ; contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ; marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388

U.S. 1 (1967) ; familial relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
and procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).

109. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
110. Id. at 536.
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The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, farreaching and devastating effects' In evil or reckless hands,
it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant
group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for
the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which
the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever
deprived of a basic liberty. We mention these matters not
to reexamine the scope of the police power of the States. We
advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict
scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or types
of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of
just and equal laws."'
While the Skinner case involved a punitive, criminal statute and
does not, therefore, overrule the Buck v. Bell conclusions regarding
eugenic measures, it is apparent that the characterization of procreation
as a constitutionally protected fundamental right and the application of
modern equal protection analysis seriously undermine the validity of
Justice Holmes' reasoning. It is highly unlikely that the eugenic
sterilization statute upheld by Holmes could pass the constitutional
muster of strict judicial scrutiny to which it would now be subjected.'"
At the time, however, Justice Holmes did not rebut or even mention
the asserted constitutional and fundamental personal rights of which
the plaintiff would be deprived by sterilization.
The shortcomings of the constitutional analysis employed in the
Supreme Court's opinion flow in part from another much criticized
facet of the holding-the philosophical premises which underlie it.11
The philosophical criticisms of Buck v. Bell are primarily centered
around a concern that the decision places too much power in the hands
of the state while ignoring the important personal rights of the individual." 4 This result has been decried as discarding "the tradition
111. Id. at 541.
112. Ferster, supra note 12, at 596, 617; Murdock, supra note 28, at 921-24;
O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 33.
113. One commentator stated that "many legal minds . . . maintain that the
philosophy of government implied in the opinion is inconsistent with and dangerous
to our American heritage." O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 32. Another asserted
that "it is the product of a juristic philosophy in complete discord with that on
which our principles of law and government are founded." Gest, supra note 71, at
306. Other scholars are similarly critical. Ferster, supra note 12, at 617-18; Kindregan, supra note 4, at 142-43.
114. Note, supra note 19, at 102. The asserted connection between the philosophical undertones of Justice Holmes' opinion and the doctrines of totalitarian
regimes proved to be all too accurate when the sterilization methods perfected in the
United States were used in Nazi Germany to eliminate undesirable characteristics
from the Aryan race. See note 4 supra. In fact, as the full horror of German
Naziism became increasingly apparent, American eugenicists who had been unre-
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of liberty," ' and described as the dawning of Aldous Huxley's Brave
New World.11 In upholding the authority of a state to determine
which of its citizens should and should not be allowed to procreate, a
governmental power which has been called by some the right to "play
God," 7 the Supreme Court deviated from the spirit of individual
liberty to an extent unparalleled in American judicial history. 1 8 The
serious dangers to individual liberty arising from compulsory sterilization practices were noted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey fourteen
years before the Buck v. Bell decision in the case of Smith v. Board of
Examiners.'1 9 In Smith, a statute providing for sterilization of epileptics, mentally retarded people, and certain criminals was struck down
as a violation of equal protection because of the potentially far-reaching
results of permitting the destruction of the procreation function in
certain members of society for the alleged benefit of society as a
whole. 120 The difficulty of assigning limits to the power of selecting
which traits are to be encouraged or to be eliminated through steriliza121
tion procedures is one of the major perils of such legislation.
Some critics have used the Buck v. Bell opinion not only to attack
eugenic sterilization practices, but also to impugn the entire juristic
philosophy of Justice Holmes. 22 Whether the opinion is representative
of some deficiencies in the underlying precepts of Holmes' jurisprudence or whether it was simply an ill-considered anomaly, the
philosophy of governmental authority expressed in Buck v. Bell is
surely not in conformity with contemporary concepts of individual
rights. The Supreme Court's opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird,121 which
struck down a statute proscribing the use of contraceptives, demonstrates the change in the Court's attitude toward individual liberty
and procreation. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual,married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
strained in their earlier praise of the German sterilization laws found themselves
compelled to retreat to more conservative positions. O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4,
at 37.
115. Gest, supra note 71, at 306.
116. Vukowich, supra note 4, at 194.
117. Id. at 201 & n.64 (citing authorities).
118. Perhaps only the cases dealing with the forced detention of persons of
Japanese ancestry during World War II reflect this same insensitivity to individual
liberty. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayishi v. United
.
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119. 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913).

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 51-52, 88 A. at 965-66.
Vukowich, supra note 4, at 198-203.
E.g., Gest, supra note 71, at 312.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 124 Decisions
such as Eisenstadt and Skinner make it highly unlikely that the rationale of Buck v. Bell can be considered philosophically sound in
light of the principles underlying the American governmental system.
III. THE PROGENY OF Buck v. Bell
It is ironic that a decision which aimed to prevent the procreation
of defective offspring has sired many deficient progeny of its own. The
cases addressing eugenic sterilization laws since 1927 have fallen into
two classes: those which have purported to apply the principles enunciated in Buck v. Bell, and those which have evaded or distinguished
its holding.
In the years following Buck v. Bell, many states again enacted
and implemented sterilization laws.125 The judicial decisions which
rely upon Buck v. Bell in upholding the validity of these laws form a
sad and somewhat bizarre chapter in the history of American jurisprudence. Those decisions are probably among the most irrational and
manifestly unjust ever handed down.
It quickly became clear that the logic of Buck v. Bell would not be
limited to the boundaries of its factual situation."" 6 In 1928, a district
court in Utah affirmed an "order of asexualization" under Utah's
eugenic sterilization law which directed the warden of the state prison
to sterilize a young black prisoner who was serving a sentence for
robbery.127 The petition for asexualization alleged that the inmate was
"afflicted with habitual sexual criminal tendencies, is a degenerate
morally," 128 and while there was no evidence that he had any hereditary defects, his testimony disclosed that prior to his imprisonment he
had frequently engaged in illicit intercourse with women. 2 9 The testimony also indicated that he had discussed and expressed interest in
engaging in sodomy with some of the other inmates, and, according
to a guard, had often "acted lovingly towards other boys who were
confined in the prison." 180 The sterilization of lusty and overly
friendly robbers is certainly a far cry from Holmes' "three generations
of imbeciles" paradigm.
124. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).

125. Vukowich, supra note 4, at 219.
126. Ferster, supra note 12, at 617-18.
127. Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 81-82, 276 P. 921, 922 (1929). The Supreme
Court of Utah remanded the case to the district court because of insufficient evidence,
but, relying upon Buck v. Bell, upheld the constitutionality of the sterilization statute
itself. Id. at 87-90, 276 P. at 924-25.
128. Id. at 90, 276 P. at 925 (Straup, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 87-88, 276 P. at 924.
130. Id. at 88, 276 P. at 924.

TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. SO

In an equally outrageous case decided in 1933,31 the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma, relying heavily upon Buck v. Bell, upheld the constitutionality of the sterilization of a thirty-nine year old, married man
who was "afflicted with an hereditary form of insanity." 132 The
sterilization procedure was invoked by the superintendent of the Central
Oklahoma State Hospital shortly before the patient was to be discharged. Apparently the reason behind efforts to sterilize this particular patient was that shortly before his commitment to the institution he and his wife, already having four children, conceived their
fifth."' 3 There was no indication that the man and his wife were not
adequately caring for their present children or were less than fully
capable of raising additional children. Nonetheless, the sterilization
order was entered and was affirmed by the high court of Oklahoma." a
In later years, similar thinking would lead some judges to impose
sterilization as a condition of probation for convicted offenders who
were welfare recipients 185 and require welfare workers to demand consent to sterilization as a prerequisite to receiving benefits.'
While the
aim of sterilization in such situations is not the elimination of hereditary defects as was stressed in Buck v. Bell, but rather the protection
of the taxpayers' pocketbook from welfare expenses, it does. fall within
the scope of Holmes' broader rationale of the desirability of weeding
out those who "sap the strength of the State." 137
The replacement of the purported desire to limit hereditary defects
with a more mercenary concern for limiting financial expenditures was
illustrated in In re Simpson 13 in 1962. Nora Ann Simpson was an
eighteen year old mentally retarded woman whose mother filed a
petition alleging that she was feeble-minded in accordance with Ohio's
procedures for having persons admitted to state institutions. Because
of overcrowding in the state's facilities for mentally retarded individuals, Judge Holland Gary decided not to order her admission. Instead,
based upon the fact that Nora Ann was physically attractive, that she
had given birth to an illegitimate child, and that she had "been sexually
promiscuous with a number of young men since the birth of the
140
child," 139 Judge Gary ordered that she be sterilized by salpingectomy.
131.
132.
133.
134.
i35.

136.
F. Supp.
137.
138.
139.
140.

In re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 P.2d 153 (1933).
Id. at 66, 19 P.2d at 154.
Id.
Id. at 68, 19 P.2d at 156.
Several such cases are discussed in Ferster, supra note !2, at 609-1S.
Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1975) ; Relf v. Weinberger, 372
1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974).
274 U.S. at 207.
88 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Muskingum County P. Ct. 1962).
Id. at 194-95, 180 N.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 196, 180 N.E.2d at 208.
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While such a ruling might appear to be based upon eugenic considerations, the court's opinion, noting that application had been made for
welfare aid for the child already born to Nora Ann, declared that to
permit her to have additional children would impose additional burdens
on the already over-burdened and under-funded county and state welfare departments. 4 1 In his zeal to guard the contents of the public
welfare coffers, Judge Gary was not deterred by the fact that Ohio
had no statute authorizing compulsory sterilization procedures. Noting
the authority of a probate judge under the commitment statutes and
general equity powers, 4 ' he ruled that the statutory authority was
broad enough to permit the court to order Nora Ann Simpson's
sterilization where the court found such an action to be in her best
interest and that of society as a whole.143 The Simpson decision has
been severely criticized. 44 Such criticism did not, however, prevent
Judge Gary from continuing to order additional sterilizations, 4"5 from
making public speeches on behalf of such practices, 4 and from influencing at least one other Ohio judge to issue a similar order. 4 7
Fortunately, however, the type of unauthorized judicial action
entered into by Judge Gary in Simpson has not been sanctioned. In
Wade v. Bethesda Hospital,14 Judge Gary was brought to account for
his sterilization activities when an allegedly mentally retarded woman
whom he had ordered to be sterilized sued him and other parties involved in the sterilization for a total of three million dollars in damages. 49 Carolyn Tucker Wade was eighteen years of age when Judge
Gary found her to be mentally retarded and ordered a salpingectomy
performed. After turning twenty-one and marrying, she filed the
damage action in federal court against the judge, the doctor who
performed the operation, the hospital where it was performed, and
141. Id. at 194-95, 180 N.E.2d at 208.
142. Id. at 194, 180 N.E.2d at 207.
143. Id. at 195, 180 N.E.2d at 208.
144. Ferster, supra note 12, at 608. One commentator reviewed the reasoning of
the court and concluded that "[i]t is difficult if not impossible to avoid the conclusion
that this court has simply conjured up a novel power without historical or statutory
basis." Note, 61 MIcH. L. Rzv. 1359, 1364 (1963).
Another article cited Simpson
as a prime example of "perversion of the law." Note, 15 SYRAcusE L. REv. 738, 753
(1964).
145. Ferster, supra note 12, at 609.
146. He reportedly told the Ohio Welfare Conference: "I appeal to you to start
a campaign in your own community for compulsory sterilization. This is a positive
action which can be taken to help reduce the ever-expanding cost of public welfare."
Ferster, supra note 12, at 609 (quoting Judge Gary).
147. Ferster, supra note 12, at 609 nn.83-85.
148. No. 70-225 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 1970), motions to dismiss denied, 337 F.
Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971), 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
149. No. 70-225, slip op. at 6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 1970).

TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 50

the social workers and welfare workers who recommended the surgery.1 50 Judge Gary moved to dismiss the complaint in Wade on the
ground that he was protected by judicial immunity."5
As in Simpson,
he pointed to his power under Ohio commitment statutes and the
general equity functions of a probate court as a source of authority
for ordering sterilizations.' 52 The federal court, however, was not
impressed with these arguments and ruled that neither the proffered
sources of judicial authority nor any other Ohio statutes gave defendant Gary the power to mandate sterilizations. The court could find
no judicial precedent for such an order in the absence of a specific
statute. 5 ' The Wade court, citing Simpson to show that Ms. Wade
was not the first individual whom Judge Gary had caused to be
sterilized, concluded that because of the lack of legal justification
under Ohio law for Judge Gary's action, he had acted "totally without
jurisdiction" in the matter and, therefore, was not protected by judicial
54
immunity.1
While the Simpson and Wade decisions dealt with the power to
order sterilizations in the absence of statutory authorization, the case
of In re Cavitt 5 5 concerned the constitutional validity of a Nebraska
compulsory sterilization act. In fact, in the years between 1940 and
1970, Cavitt is the only decision relying upon Buck v. Bell to uphold
the constitutionality of an involuntary sterilization statute. 5 ' In addition to that dubious distinction, Cavitt also deserves notice as one of the
most anomalous decisions ever rendered.
In Cavitt, sterilization was sought for Gloria Cavitt who was
thirty-five years old at the time of the proceeding. For four years
prior to this time, she had resided at the Beatrice State Home,
150. Id. at 1-3.
151. 337 F. Supp. at 672.
152. Id. at 673.
153. Id. at 673-74.
154. Id. at 674. Accord, Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977).
After denial of motions to dismiss by other defendants, 356 F. Supp. at 385, the
defendants agreed to settle the case for what was described as "a substantial sum of
money." Telephone interview with plaintiffs' counsel, Edward G. Marks, Esq., in
October, 1973.
155. 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171, reh. denied, 183 Neb. 243, 159 N.W.2d 566
(1968) prob. juris noted sub nor. Cavitt v. Nebraska, 393 U.S. 1078, vacated as
moot, 196 U.S. 996 (1969).
156. Ferster, supra note 12, at 595-96; Gauvey & Shuger, The Permissibility of
Involuntary Sterilization Under the Parens Patriae and Police Power Authority of
4-aC te,

11 141D.
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An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court in Cavitt, and the
Court noted probable jurisdiction over the case. Cavitt v. Nebraska, 393 U.S. 1078
(1969).
Some commentators have suggested that the Court's acceptance of the
appeal indicates a willingness to reconsider the ruling in Buck v. Bell. Gauvey &
Shuger, supra note 156, at 127 n.170. Before the Supreme Court heard the case,
however, the Nebraska legislature repealed the compulsory sterilization measure, id.,
and the case was voluntarily dismissed as moot. 396 U.S. 996 (1969).
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Nebraska's institution for the mentally retarded. Before her commitment, she had lived for fourteen years with her common law husband
and their eight children. 15 7 There was no indication that she had any
sexual liaisons outside her common law relationship or that she had
ever been sexually promiscuous. Under the statute, there was no requirement that she be found to be sexually active or likely to conceive
additional children but merely that she be "apparently capable of bearing offspring." ' Gloria was given an I.Q. test and was assigned a
score of seventy-one,1 59 which according to the classification system in
vogue at that time qualified her as "borderline mentally retarded." 160
While such a classification would place her, as the Cavitt court noted,
in the lower two or three percent of the population in intelligence, 161
it is a relatively high status of functioning by mental retardation
standards and, indeed, would today be too high to qualify as mental
retardation at all.'0 2
The decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska authorizing
Gloria Cavitt's sterilization was supported by three justices with four
justices dissenting. Therefore, although four of Nebraska's seven
supreme court justices agreed with the trial court that the sterilization
statute was unconstitutional, the act was nonetheless upheld. 8 This
odd result was engendered by a provision of the Nebraska constitution
which required the concurrence of five judges to hold a legislative act
unconstitutional. 1
The sterilization statute at issue in Cavitt was also somewhat
atypical. The Nebraska statute gave broad powers to the Board of
Examiners of Mental Deficients to order a sterilization to be performed
whenever the patient is mentally deficient, apparently capable of bearing
children, and, in the Board's opinion, should be sterilized as a condition
to parole or discharge.1 5 The broad scope and vagueness of this statutory language so concerned the dissenting justices 166 that one justice
found the standard too general to determine under what circumstances
the legislature intended to permit sterilization. The act, he argued,
157. 182 Neb. at 716, 157 N.W.2d at 174-75.
158. Id. at 715, 157 N.W.2d at 174-75.
159. Id. at 717, 157 N.W.2d at 175.
160. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION,
THE KNOWN

AND

THE UNKNOWN

3, 10-11 (1975)

MENTAL

RETARDATION

[hereinafter referred to as

PRESrDENT'S COMM.].

161. 182 Neb. at 717, 157 N.W.2d at 175.
162. See PRESIDENT'S COMm., supra note 160, at 10-11.
163. 182 Neb. at 722-23, 157 N.W.2d at 178.
164. NEB. CONsT. art. V, § 2.
165. 182 Neb. at 713-14, 157 N.W.2d at 174.
166. Id. at 723-35, 157 N.W.2d at 181-85 (Smith, McCown, Newton, Boslaugh,

J.J., dissenting).
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gave the Board of Examiners absolute discretion to decide when enforcement was desirable. Hence, the Board could act arbitrarily, depending on the individual philosophies of its members. 16 7 Three
justices, on the other hand, held that the act was a reasonable exercise
of the police power. 188
It is important to note that the Nebraska sterilization law, unlike
the statute in Buck v. Bell, was not couched in terms of preventing
hereditary defects. In fact, the statute upheld in Cavitt had been
enacted specifically to replace an earlier sterilization statute which had
focused upon hereditary factors."8 9 The Cavitt court observed that
the act did not require the finding that the mental deficiency be inheritable nor did the evidence support any such finding. 70 The cause
of the plaintiff's condition was unknown and no investigation had been
conducted regarding the mental condition of her parents or her
7
children.1 1
The court discounted heredity as a determinant of when sterilizations should be performed, and offered very little guidance as to what
other factors should be determinative. Although the court noted that
"[e]nvironment is a factor that must be considered," 172 the mere
recitation of such a broad truism is no real directive as to what classes
of cases are appropriate for the imposition of sterilizations.
In the absence of any concrete standards for determining subjects
for sterilization, the danger expressed in the Cazitt dissents, that such
decisions will be made on arbitrary grounds influenced by the personal
biases and beliefs of the members of the Board of Examiners, is very
real. Indeed, this fear is characterized by the situation in the Cavitt
case itself for the facts of the case fail to show why Gloria Cavitt was
singled out as the victim of a sterilization operation.173 Rather, it
appears, that having discarded the shibboleth of heredity to terminate
167. Id. at 730, 157 N.W.2d at 182 (Newton, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 720, 157 N.W.2d at 177.
169. Id. at 715, 157 N.W.2d at 174-75.
170. Id. at 714, 157 N.W.2d at 174.
171. "It is apparent here that the board could order the sterilization of a patient
who had suffered mental deficiency from an accident or disease, or some form of
mental deficiency entirely unrelated to the transmission to offspring of a tendency to
mental deficiency." Id. at 716, 157 N.W.2d at 175.
172. Id. at 719. 157 N.W_2d at 177.
173. The language employed by the three justice "majority" suggests some possible explanations for the singling out of Ms. Cavitt: "[s]he came from a low social
and economic group . . . ;" [bloth she and the children were provided for largely

by public aid," id. at 716, 157 N.W.2d at 175; "[tlhe Beatrice State Home is full to
overflowing . . . " id. at 721, 157 N.W.2d at 177; and "[mental deficiency with its
alarming results presents a social and economic problem of grave importance .
Id. at 720-21, 157 N.W.2d at 17E.

STERILIZATION OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS

1977]

the right to procreate, the Cavitt court substituted a concern for the
state's fiscal integrity.
There were also indications that the Cavitt ruling was based in
part upon some myths regarding the characteristics of mentally handicapped people. Although there was no direct evidence that Ms. Cavitt
had been indiscriminate sexually, the court was willing to infer a
tendency toward sexual impropriety from the mere existence of mental
subnormality by stating that "[it] is an established fact that mental
deficiency accelerates sexual impulses and any tendencies toward crime
to a harmful degree." 174
Perhaps the most atrocious feature of the decision is that the three
justice "majority," sensing that its opinion did not rest upon a solid
foundation, refused to take the ultimate responsibility for mandating
Gloria Cavitt's sterilization:
We point out that the sterilization statute before us is compulsory only when required before release from the Beatrice
State Home. It is not compulsory in the sense that the
patient is to be sterilized under all circumstances, since it is
applicable only as a prerequisite to discharge or parole from
the home. Remaining in the home makes the statute inapplicable.' 75
Upon motion for rehearing, the three justice "majority" reiterated its
view even more bluntly by stating that "[t]he order does not require
her sterilization. It does provide, in accordance with the statute, that
she shall not be released unless she is sterilized. The choice is hers." 176
It is apparent, however, that forcing a person into a situation where
he or she must choose between the lesser of two evils-between giving
up the right to procreate or giving up one's liberty-does not result in
a truly voluntary action. As one of the dissenting justices noted, "the
coercive feature is hardly masked by the fictive option of sterilization
or life imprisonment." 177
The Cavitt holding should be contrasted with Kaimowita v. Michigan Department of Mental Health 17I where the court ruled that a
mentally ill adult who resided in a state mental health institution could
not give informed consent to psychosurgery because he lacked sufficient
bargaining power relative to institution officials and, therefore, might
be subject to undue influence. The Kaimowita court relied in part
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 719, 157 N.W.2d at 177.
Id. at 720, 157 N.W.2d at 177.
183 Neb. at 247, 159 N.W.2d at 568.
182 Neb. at 723, 157 N.W.2d at 179.
No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973) reported

in 2 PRISON L. Rpm. 433 (1973).
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upon the Ten Nuremberg Standards for Human Experimentation developed from Nazi war crimes cases. 179 The Standards were advanced
to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concerns about the questions of
voluntary consent to medical procedures. s The Kaimowita court held
that the institutional atmosphere is inherently coercive, and the lack
of meaningful alternatives can operate as constraint sufficient to vitiate
the consent of an involuntarily confined mental patient.181 These observations regarding the lack of any true choice apply with equal
force to the Cavitt situation. The purported choice available to Gloria
Cavitt would, therefore, not satisfy the minimal concepts of human
82
justice and legality as reflected in the Nuremberg StandardsY.
The offspring spawned by Buck v. Bell have continued into the
1970's. In 1972, the Court of Appeals of Oregon decided the case of
Cook v. State 183 which approved the sterilization of a seventeen
year old mentally disturbed girl under an Oregon statute purporting
to prevent the procreation of children "[w]ho would become neglected
or dependent children as a result of the parent's inability by reason
of mental illness or mental retardation to provide adequate care." 184
Thus, as in Cavitt, the sterilization law at issue in Cook goes beyond
the eugenic considerations upheld in Buck v. Bell and deals instead
with the question of the fitness of particular individuals to be parents.
Nancy Rae Cook was a ward of the court who, at age thirteen,
had been removed from her home because she had been physically
and sexually abused by her family over a long period of time. 8 5 As a
result of such abuse, she had suffered brain damage and severe emotional disturbance. The sterilization petition was filed as a result
of her indiscriminate sexual involvements in the hospital,' and was
179. J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HumAN BEINGS 292-306 (1972). See
Note, 50 CHI.-KENT L REv. 526, 535 (1973).
180. One of the standards provided that "the person involved must have legal

capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power
of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion ....
"
J. KATZ, supra

note 179, at 305.
181. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973); Note,

.rupra note 179, at 535-36.
182. In the early 1970's, patients of the Beatrice State Home filed a lawsuit in
federal court alleging that the physical conditions, care, treatment and training provided did not meet minimum constitutional standards and that, as such, constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71, 72 (D. Neb. 1973).

183. 9 Or. App. 224, 226, 495 P.2d 768, 770 (197?).
184. OR. REV. STAT. §436.070(1)(b) (1973). The statute, enacted in 1969,
created a State Board of Social Protection to administer the state's sterilization

program. Id. §§436.010-.150 (1973).
One commentator has called the Oregon
sterilization scheme "barbarian." Pilpel, Birth Control and a New Birth of Freedom,
27 OHIO ST. L.J. 679, 682 (1966).

185. 9 Or. App. at 236, 495 P.2d at 770.
186. Id. at 227, 495 P.2d at 770.
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supported by the testimony of a psychiatrist who questioned her
parenting ability.1 7 One might doubt the validity of a judgment predicting her parenting ability for the remainder of her life based upon
her emotional state as a seventeen year old girl. However, a more
potent objection to the judgment is that the right of individuals to
procreate cannot depend upon the discretion of the state to judge any
person's capability to properly raise children. Whatever the shortcomings of Buck v. Bell in approving eugenic sterilizations, the Supreme Court has never indicated that states have the authority to
predict potentially good parents and to condition permission to have
children upon such predictions. A system whereby a state would
only permit approved couples to have children is difficult to reconcile with legal precepts of individual rights and limitations upon governmental power.
Moreover, there are many pitfalls in trying to make predictions
of fitness for parenthood. 8 8 There are no objective, identifiable criteria which determine that a person will be a good parent. Assets
such as education, wealth, and intelligence do not always insure that
a person will possess the ability to adequately care for and nurture
children. Emotional relationships are more determinative of parenting ability than one's intelligence quotient.'8 9 In regard to a
parent's possession of wealth, it was established long before Buck v.
Bell that a legislative scheme which allows rich people to procreate
while mandating the sterilization of poor persons is impermissible discrimination which runs afoul of the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws.1 90 The court in Cook neither wrestled with
the basic constitutional issues raised by the Oregon sterilization statute
nor discussed the degree to which it goes beyond the Buck v. Bell
rationale for eugenic sterilizations. Instead the court rested its decision upon a bald assertion that the state's concern for the welfare of its
citizenry extends to future generations. When there is evidence
that a potential parent will be unable to provide a proper environment
19
for a child, the state has sufficient interest to order sterilization. 1
The court's failure to address the difficult but important due process
and equal protection issues greatly undermines the precedential value
192
of Cook.
187. Id. at 229-30, 495 P.2d at 770.
188. Murdock, supra note 28, at 928-32.
189. L. KA.NNER, A MINIATURE TEXTBOOK OF FEEBLE-MINDDNESS 5 (1949),
quoted in Bligh, Sterilization and Mental Retardation,51 A.B.A.J. 1059, 1062 (1965).
190. Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913).
191. 9 Or. App. at 230, 495 P.2d at 771-72.
192. Gauvey & Shuger, supra note 156, at 127 n.170.
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While the several cases just discussed have sought to apply and
expand the principles of Buck v. Bell in upholding compulsory sterilization laws, by far the greater number of cases decided since 1927 have
avoided the Buck v. Bell rationale and have refused to authorize sterilizations. 93 Some courts, without questioning the Buck v. Bell finding that states have the authority to subject classes of their citizens
to sexual sterilizations, have ruled that such power can only be exercised in compliance with requirements of procedural due process.
Accordingly, sterilization procedures which did not include adequate
notice, hearing, and judicial appeal provisions have been declared unconstitutional under the due process clause." 4 Subsequent decisions
have also limited the logic of Buck v. Bell to situations where there
is a specific statute authorizing such sterilizations.9 5 The overwhelming trend in judicial precedent has been to preclude parents, guardians,
and courts from giving consent for the sterilization of mentally incompetent adults 198 and from compelling the sterilization of minors in
the absence of a state sterilization law.'97 The result of these decisions
is to render compulsory sterilization procedures illegal in more than
half of the states which do not have an involuntary sterilization statute.198 The number of states having eugenic sterilization laws has
been decreasing,9'9 and even in states where there is such a law the
number of sterilization operations actually performed each year has
193. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F.
Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973)
(three-judge court); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973) ;
In re Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935); Guardianship of
Kemp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758 (1974); A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d
501 (Ind. App. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976) ; Holmes v. Powers, 439
S.W.2d 579 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974);
Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933); In re Lambert, No. 61156
(Tenn. P. Ct. Mar. 4, 1976); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969) ; In re Hendrickson, 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942).
194. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973) ; In re Opinion of
the Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935); Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167
S.E. 638 (1933) ; In re Hendrickson, 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1943).
195. While the Buck v. Bell ruling that eugenic sterilization is within the scope
of the police power of the states was made in the context of a sterilization statute,
it might have been possible for the Buck v. Bell rationale to have been expanded to
other situations where there was no specific statutory authorization. For a discussion
of In re Simpson, see pp. 1014-16 supra. See In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 470-71
(Mo. 1974).
196. Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 765, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64, 69
(1974); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); Frazier v.
Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
197. Wade v. Bethesda Hcsp., No. 70-225, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 7,
1970) ; A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 936 (1976) ; In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 470-71 (Mo. 1974) ; In re Lambert,
No. 61156, slip op. at 8 (Tenn. P. Ct. Mar. 4, 1976).
198. Gauvey & Shuger, supra note 156, at 121 n.11.
199. Ferster, supra note 12, at 613 n.107. Indiana, which had the nation's first
such law, repealed its eugenic sterilization statute in 1974. A.L. v. G.R.H., 325
N.E.2d 501, 502 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976)).
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dwindled. 00 These factors plus the judicial limitations placed upon
the principles expounded in Buck v. Bell make it clear that the impact
of the decision has been significantly emasculated.
IV. THE

CURRENT VIABILITY OF THE

Buck v. Bell

PRECEDENT

Numerous commentators have pointed out the shortcomings of
Justice Holmes' reasoning and conclusions in Buck v. Bell. Some
critics have speculated that the Supreme Court would reverse its opinion on the Buck v. Bell holding if again asked to rule on a eugenic
sterilization law.2" 1 Since Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court has decided Skinner v. Oklahoma which exhibits a philosophy almost diametrically opposed to the principles enunciated by Justice Holmes.20 2
The concept of eugenic sterilization as a proper instrument of state
power has steadily dwindled, 203 yet Buck v. Bell has never been overruled.
Doubt as to continuing validity of the Buck v. Bell precedent has
caused some confusion among handicapped persons, their families,
medical personnel, family planning workers, institution personnel, and
other persons concerned about sterilization procedures. In light of
serious questions about the constitutionality of compulsory sterilization measures, most current sterilization statutes would seem invalid.
Moreover, compulsory sterilization in the absence of a statute is
patently unlawful.204 The existence of Buck v. Bell may, therefore,
lull many persons into a misinformed belief that sterilization of any
and all defectives is sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court
and encourage an attitude which fosters illegal involuntary sterilizations.
There is also a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the legality
of voluntary sterilizations of handicapped individuals.20 3 In the absence of a state statutory provision prohibiting voluntary sterilizations, 2° an individual may, by giving informed consent, submit himself or herself to a sterilization operation. 2 7 Difficulties arise, however,
if an individual seeking a sterilization is a minor or mentally incompetent and is, therefore, incapable of giving legally valid consent.
200. Ferster, supra note 12, at 613, 619; Note, supra note 19, at 112 n.94.
201. Ferster, supra note 12, at 596 & n.29 (citing authorities). See p. 1008 supra.
202. See p. 1010 supra.
203. O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 4, at 40-41; Note, supra note 19, at 112.
204. See text accompanying notes 196-97 supra.
205. Ferster, supra note 12, at 620-22; Murdock, supra note 28, at 932-34; Note,
spra note 14, at 265-69.
206. Iowa, Kansas, and Utah have had statutes forbidding voluntary sterilizations.
Note, supra note 14, at 266 & nn.129-31.
207. Id. at 266, 269.
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Ordinarily, parents or legal guardians of such persons would have the
power to provide consent on their behalf,208 but such consent is not
valid for sterilization unless authorized by statute.0 9 It seems, therefore, that for minors and legally incompetent adults there is no legal
way to obtain a voluntary sterilization. This results in serious problems for a person declared incompetent pursuant to commitment laws
or other legal proceedings who has the mental ability to appreciate the
responsibilities of parenthood and the implications of sterilization.210
A person who is capable, both mentally and legally, of giving informed
consent may be unable to obtain a sterilization if physicians balk
because he or she appears incompetent or looks retarded.2 1 Many
doctors refuse to perform such operations because of uncertainty about
the type of situations in which voluntary sterilization is justified under
state law.2 12 While handicapped people may be denied the equal
protection of the laws by being forced to undergo sterilization operations,218 they may also be denied equal protection by being prohibited
from obtaining voluntary sterilizations which are available to the rest
of the populace.
The issue of voluntary sterilization is further complicated by the
necessity to avoid the imposition of coercion and duress. In some
situations, sterilization is made a condition precedent to release from
an institution, thus negating its voluntary feature.2 14 Voluntariness
may also be vitiated by threats to terminate welfare assistance,21 5 to
refuse or revoke parole or probation, 1 8 to use subtle and unsubtle
forms of retribution in a residential institution,21 7 or to use other
208. Murdock, supra note 28, at 932.
209. See text accompanying notes 196-97 supra; Gauvey & Shuger, supra note
156, at 113-16.
210. Murdock, supra note 28, at 933.
211. One author has pointed out that "[r]etardation is not co-extensive with lack
of capacity to give informed consent," and has argued that more than 90% of persons
who are mentally retarded are capable of making an informed choice of whether or
not to be sterilized. Id. at 933.
212. Ferster, supra note 12, at 620.
213. See note 47 supra and text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
214. As long ago as 1935, the American Neurological Association reported:
[T]he word voluntary is frequently a mere subterfuge, in that it is often a
condition of discharge from the institution that the patient be sterilized, and
consequently the individual involved is in the position of being confined or
confinable until he gives his consent for sterilization, which hardly makes
the bargain free and equal and nullifies the real meaning of the word
voluntary.
COMM. OF Am. NEuRoLoGicAL Ass'N, EUGENICAL STERIIzATION 7-8 (1935),

quoted

in Ferster, supra note 12, at 621. Compare id. with text accompanying note 175
(Cavitt court's view of voluntary sterilization).
215. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
216. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
217. See pp. 1019-21 supra.
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forms of fraud and heavy-handed persuasive techniques. 1 8 The
proper goal of legislation in this area should be to provide procedural
safeguards to insure the voluntariness of sterilization, rather than to
eliminate the element of free choice through compulsory sterilization
as did the statute upheld in Buck v. Bell.2 19
Such concerns, complications, and confusion make it imperative
that questions about the legality of compulsory eugenic sterilization
and the current validity of the holding in Buck v. Bell be addressed
directly and comprehensively in future judicial decisions. Recently,
a three-judge federal district court took a significant first step toward
a critical reexamination of forced sterilization and the principles of
Buck v. Bell. North Carolina Association for Retarded Children v.
State 220 involved a challenge to the constitutionality of North Carolina's sterilization statute 2 1 Since the issue of sterilization was part
of a broad action involving "the whole panoply of constitutional rights
of mentally retarded persons in North Carolina," 22 the three-judge
court held a separate evidentiary hearing on the sterilization questions.22 3
The North Carolina statute, effective on January 1, 1975, applies
to both voluntary and involuntary sterilization operations, and requires that neither shall be performed except pursuant to an order
issued by the appropriate state district court. 24 A petition for a
sterilization order must be made by the director of a state institution
for inmates or by the county director of social services for persons
residing in the community.225 The statute makes it the duty of a
petitioner to institute sterilization proceedings in the following circumstances:
(1) when he feels that the sterilization is in the best
interests of the mental, moral or physical improvement of the
mentally ill or retarded person,
(2) when he feels that sterilization is in the best interests of the public at large,
(3) when, in his opinion, the retarded person "would be
likely, unless sterilized, to procreate a child or children who
218. One mentally retarded girl sterilized at the Pacific State Hospital in
Pomona, California, was told that she was going to have her appendix removed.
Bligh, supra note 189, at 1063.
219. Murdock, supra note 28, at 934.

220. 420 F. Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976) [hereinafter referred to as N.C.A.RC.].
221. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§35-36 to 35-50 (1976).
222. 420 F. Supp. at 453.

223. Id.
224. Id. at 454-55.
225. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36, 35-37 (1976).
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would have a tendency to serious physical, mental, or nervous
disease or deficiency; or, because of a physical, mental, or
nervous disease or deficiency which is not likely to materially
improve, the person would be unable to care for a child or
children,"
(4) when the next of kin or legal guardian of the mentally ill or retarded person requests that he file the petition. 226
Upon the filing of a petition for a sterilization order, the statute
provides procedural safeguards, including provisions for notice, Miranda-type warnings, a right to counsel, an evidentiary hearing, a right
to present evidence, a right to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses,
a right to a written transcript, and a right of appeal. 227 The failure
of the statute to include any statement of the petitioner's burden of
proof 228 was resolved in an earlier case when the North Carolina
Supreme Court declared that "in keeping with the intent of the General Assembly . . . that the rights of the individual must be fully
protected, we hold that the evidence must be clear, strong and convincing before such an order may be entered." 229
Despite these stringent procedural safeguards, it is clear that a
standard authorizing sterilization for the public good or in the best
interest of the affected person 230 is extremely broad. The plaintiff
class of mentally retarded persons, joined by the United States Department of Justice as plaintiff-intervenor, challenged this statutory
scheme as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. 21 ' The three-judge court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the statute but only through a drastic
judicial rewriting of its provisions. This narrowing of the statute's
scope was premised upon certain findings of fact by the N.C.A.R.C.
court. Additionally, the court pointed to theories which undermined
the validity of Buck v. Bell:
Most competent geneticists now reject social Darwinism and
doubt the premise implicit in Mr. Justice Holmes' incantation
that "three generations of imbeciles is enough."..... [P] revalent medical opinion views with distaste even voluntary
sterilization for the mentally retarded and is inclined to sanction it only as a last resort and in relatively extreme cases.
226.
227.
228.
229.
added).
decision,
230.
231.

420 F. Supp. at 455 (paraphrasing id. § 35-39).
N.C. C . S-RR
35_An
41, 3'
Lu35-45 (1976).
420 F. Supp. at 457.
In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 108, 221 S.E.2d 307, 315 (1976) (emphasis
For an extensive discussion and criticism of other facets of the Moore
see Gauvey & Shuger, supra note 156.
420 F. Supp. at 455.
Id. at 457-58.
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In short, the medical and. genetical experts are no longer
sold on sterilization to benefit either retarded patients or the
future of the Republic. 22
The court also noted the decreasing use of involuntary sterilization
and the diminishing confidence in it except when used for contraception. 2- s Clearly, the three-judge tribunal viewed the Buck v. Bell
rationale as outdated.
The court's contention that Justice Holmes' theories of heredity
were inaccurate did not mean that the court viewed compulsory sterilization as universally impermissible. Rather, the court considered
expert testimony and concluded that "rarely would a competent doctor
recommend involuntary sterilization . . . [except] in an extreme
case." 284 To determine the situations which qualify as extreme cases
justifying compulsory sterilization, the court listed five general propositions concerning the relationship between mental retardation and the
right to procreate which were established by the evidence in the case:
(a) Mental retardation in some cases has as its cause an
identifiable genetic defect. Under some circumstances it is
within the capability of modern medical and genetical science
to establish that the genetic defect is inheritable and that
there is a significant probability or substantial likelihood that
the offspring of a mentally defective parent would also be
retarded.
(b) Mental retardation in some cases can be traced to an
environment which blocks or shrinks the mental and intellectual development of a child. Under some circumstances it
is within the capability of modern medical and sociological
science to determine that a mentally retarded parent or parents would be incapable of providing offspring with an
environment in which a child could reasonably be expected to
develop in a normal manner. As a corollary to this proposition, it is in some cases possible to predict with substantial
accuracy that a mentally retarded person would be incapable
of discharging the responsibilities of parenthood.
(c) While mentally retarded persons may be entitled to express themselves sexually, it can in some cases be determined
that a mentally defective person does not understand or cannot appreciate the natural consequences of sexual activity.
232. Id. at 454 (footnote omitted). With regard to voluntary sterilizations, the
court observed in a footnote that "[b]ecause mentally retarded persons are often
highly suggestible, to say it is 'voluntary' may mean only that the retardee has been
talked into it without even necessarily understanding it." Id. at 454 n.2.
233. Id. at 454.
234. Id.

TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 50

It can, likewise, be determined in some cases that the conception of a child is neither the intention nor the expectation of
the sexually active mental retardate.
(d) Some mentally retarded persons who are sexually active
may not want children. While many sexually active retarded persons are capable of employing various methods of
birth control effectively, some are incapable of effective voluntary contraception.
(e) In rare and unusual cases, it can be medically determined that involuntary sterilization is in the best interests
of either the mentally retarded person or the State or both.2" 5
The three-judge panel stressed that these statements did not apply to
all or even a majority of the plaintiff class of mentally retarded people, but that they were true with regard to some members of the
class.23 6
To reconcile these factual findings with the broad language and
vague purposes of the North Carolina statute entailed some manipulation by the N.C.A.R.C. court. As a first step, the court severed from
the act the provision which required initiation of a sterilization petition
whenever requested by the next of kin or legal guardian of a mentally retarded person." 7 It viewed this provision as based upon
unstated premises that relatives and guardians are always competent
persons to decide that sterilization proceedings should be initiated and
that they always have the best interest of the retarded person in
mind."' The court found this confidence in all next of kin and all
legal guardians unwarranted. 39 Labeling such authority of next of kin
and guardians "the power of a tyrant," the court held this provision
unconstitutional "as an arbitrary and capricious delegation of unbridled power" and an irrational deviation from the sensible scheme
of responsibility allocated in the other subparagraphs. 240 Next, the
court postulated that the sterilization statute is founded upon two
basic, unarticulated principles which are frequently incorrect: 241
First, the statute presumes that it is possible in some cases
to determine that the retarded person has a genetic defect
which likely would be inherited by his children. Secondly,
the statute presumes that some persons may be so severely
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. nt 454-55.
Id. at 454.
See text accompanying note 226 supra.
420 F. Supp. at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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retarded that they would be unable to properly care for a
child should they conceive one.242
Finally, based upon a dubious assumption that "it must have been the
sense of the legislature to require only that which is necessary," 243
the federal court panel engrafted a requirement that the state district
court judge in a sterilization action "must find that the subject is
likely to engage in sexual activity without utilizing contraceptive devices and is therefore likely to impregnate or become impregnated." 244
The effect of this redrafting of the sterilization act by the threejudge court was to produce a law quite different in scope and impact
from the statutory language.2 4 After considerable reinterpretation of
the North Carolina statute, the court then explored whether it met
constitutional standards. Deviating from the Buck v. Bell reasoning,
the N.C.A.R.C. court, in evaluating the equal protection and due
process challenges to the statute, purportedly applied the compelling
governmental interest test 248 rather than the rational basis analysis employed by Justice Holmes. 247 Noting that statutory classifications
based upon suspect criteria or affecting fundamental rights will be invalid unless justified by a compelling governmental interest, the threejudge court relied upon Skinner v. Oklahoma2a and Eisenstadt v.
Baird 249 to rule that procreation is a fundamental right but that a
compelling state interest justified the North Carolina statute.250 In
answer to the substantive due process challenge, the court found that
the statute expressed a legitimate state interest in preventing the birth
of a defective child or the birth of a nondefective child that cannot be
cared for by its parent. The court deemed this interest compelling,
thereby finding that the statute comported with substantive due
process.2 5' Similarly, in regard to the equal protection issue, the
court ruled that the legislative purpose "reflects a compelling state
242. Id.

243. Id. at 457.
244. Id. at 456.
245. Thus, the court observed that:
[T]he classification is itself narrowed as to impact so that as we interpret it,
only mentally retarded persons who are sexually active, and unwilling or
incapable of controlling procreation by other contraceptive means, and who
are found to be likely to procreate a defective child, or who would be unable
because of the degree of retardation to be able to care for a child, may be
sterilized.

Id. at 457 (emphasis in original).
246. Id. at 458.
247. See text accompanying note 107 miupra.

248. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
249. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
250. 420 F. Supp. at 458.
251. Id.

See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
See text accompanying notes 123-24 supra.
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interest and the classification rests upon a difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation and does not, therefore, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States." 252
Although the N.C.A.R.C. court addressed the constitutional
issues, it is questionable whether the court properly applied the compelling interest test. While the court was vigorous in asserting that
there is a compelling state interest justifying sterilization, it did not
relate the compelling interest standard to the need for sterilizing the
specific class of persons affected. For equal protection purposes in
particular, the justification as to why a particular group is singled
out to be deprived of a fundamental right is crucial to the concept of
strict judicial scrutiny. Since many genetic defects have been scientifically determined to be inheritable from parents who are not mentally
retarded,253 the asserted state interest in preventing the birth of defective children could only be achieved by a sterilization program which
includes all persons having these defective genes and not merely those
who are themselves mentally retarded. Furthermore, inability to care
for children is neither characteristic of, nor limited to, mentally retarded people,25 4 so that the state interest in preventing the birth of
children whose parents are unable to care for them could more properly be achieved by sterilizing not just mentally retarded individuals,
but everyone who appears unfit for parenthood. To accomplish the
objective of the compelling governmental interest asserted by the threejudge federal tribunal-to prevent defective and uncared for childrenNorth Carolina's sterilization program should instead include all persons who are sexually active and unwilling or unable to control procreation by other contraceptive means and who are likely to procreate
a defective child, or who would be unable to care for a child. The
North Carolina sterilization scheme appears, therefore, to be susceptible
to constitutional challenge as defining a class that is both over and
255
underinclusive in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
However, close examination of the N.C.A.R.C. opinion reveals
that the court's use of the compelling governmental interest test is
illusory: the statutory classification is actually evaluated by a more
lenient standard akin to the rational basis test. This is made apparent
when the court evaluates this statute's adequacy in providing equal
protection to the plaintiff class:
252.
253.
924-28.
254.
255.

Id.
See note 90 supra and accompanying text. See Murdock, supra note 28, at
See notes 188-90 supra and accompanying text.
Murdock, supra note 28, at 931-32.
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We hold that the legislative classification of mentally retarded persons is neither arbitrarynor capricious, but rests
upon respectable medical knowledge and opinion that such
persons are in fact different from the general population and
may rationallybe accorded different
treatment for their bene256
fit and the benefit of the public.

Nor is this rational basis test applied correctly by the N.C.A.R.C.
court, since the relevant question is not whether the affected class is
different from the rest of the population, but rather whether the selection of a particular class for differential treatment is rationally
related to the objectives of the legislation. 25 7 That is, the issue is not
whether mentally retarded people are different from others but whether
mental retardation is rationally related to the governmental objectives of preventing the birth of defective children or the birth of
children to unfit parents. Conceivably, a court could hold such a
statute unconstitutional even under the minimal scrutiny of rational
258
basis analysis.
There are other problems with the N.C.A.R.C. opinion. The
court can be criticized for appropriating a legislative function in its
zealous attempt to construe the statute as constitutional. In addition,
the asserted theory that sterilization is appropriate for individuals who
are unable to care for children overlooks the possibility that a person
who, alone, is unable to care for children may be married to or later
marry a person who is fully capable of doing so. In such a situation,
sterilization would unnecessarily deprive a couple of the opportunity
to have children.
Finally, the decision does not adequately address the legal doctrine of the least restrictive alternative.2 59 In explaining the evolution
of this doctrine, the Supreme Court noted:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of the legislative abridgement
must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.260
This principle has been applied by other courts in evaluating the constitutionality of an array of governmental actions which infringe
256. 420 F. Supp. at 457 (emphasis added).
257. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425 (1961).
258. See Murdock, supra note 28, at 922 n.30.
259. For a discussion of available alternatives, see Gauvey & Shuger, supra note
156, at 118; Murdock, supra note 28, at 927-28.
260. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 483 (1960).
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upon individual rights.2 1 However, the doctrine of the least restricThe
tive alternative has not been applied to sterilization statutes.
court in the N.C.A.R.C. case mentioned that sterilization should be
limited to those persons who are "unwilling or incapable of controlling procreation by other contraceptive means," 282 but no affirmative
duty was placed upon state officials to make sure that alternative birth
control methods were explored. Before resorting to sterilization, the
state of North Carolina should be required to demonstrate that it has
made available genetic and sex counseling and voluntary means of
birth control, that it has explored the feasibility of temporary involuntary birth control methods, and that none of these alternatives to
One application of the least restrictive
sterilization is workable.2
alternative doctrine to sterilization cases was provided in In re Anderson 26 where the court refused to issue a sterilization order and held

that there were less drastic alternatives which needed to be explored.2
The preceding criticisms of the N.C.A.R.C. decision should not
obscure the fact that the opinion makes several important contributions to the legal theories on compulsory sterilization. It is a harbinger of a complete judicial reevaluation of the Buck v. Bell precedent. As noted previously,2 6 the N.C.A.R.C. court candidly declared
that the scientific basis of Justice Holmes' reasoning-the eugenic
laws of heredity-is no longer valid. Thus, despite some problems
with the way in which the N.C.A.R.C. court applied its constitutional
analysis, 281 the opinion undercuts the rational basis standard employed in Buck v. Bell and substitutes the notion that procreation is a
fundamental right which can only be abridged where the compelling
governmental interest test is met. In so doing, the N.C.A.R.C. decision aligns itself more closely with the constitutional principles of
Skinner v. Oklahoma2 s than with Buck v. Bell. Moreover, in confining, through judicial interpretation, the impact of the North Carolina statute, the N.C.A.R.C. decision casts grave doubt on the constitu261. E.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (restrictions on the mentally ill beyond those required by hospitalization are deprivations of
liberty); Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268, 271 (D.N.H. 1972) (compulsory
haircuts for pretrial detainees violate personal liberty interests guaranteed by the
due process clause) ; Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 216, 507 P.2d 1345, 1357,

107 Cal. Rptr. 137, 149 (1973)

(regulation rather than denial of voting franchise to

convicted criminals imposes least burdensome method on right of suffrage).

262. 420 F. Supp. at 457.
263. See Murdock, supra note 28, at 927-28. Eventually. improvement of contraepie e
s and tiie development of reversible sterilization procedures may
make irreversible sterilization operations obsolete.
264. No. 5-67-11648 (Dane County Ct., Wis. Nov. 1974).
265. Gauvey & Shuger, supra note 156, at 118.
266. See text accompanying note 234 supra.
267. See text accompanying notes 253-58 sapra.

268. See text accompanying notes 132-35 supra.
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tionality of more expansive statutes such as that upheld in Buck
v. Bell. In narrowly construing the North Carolina law to be constitutionally valid, the N.C.A.R.C. court declared: "It would be
otherwise had the State presumed to enact and implement that all
mentally retarded persons should be sterilized." 269
The N.C.A.R.C. opinion could have gone further in addressing
the constitutional questions involved in the forced sterilization of
classes of citizens and the legitimacy and gravity of governmental
reasons for doing so. It could and should have grappled with the
feasibility of alternative methods for accomplishing such objectives.
It ought to have looked more deeply into the question of why particular
types of citizens are singled out for deprivation of their procreative
function. In the final analysis, however, the N.C.A.R.C. opinion
merits applause for being the first decision to directly confront and
reappraise the validity of the Supreme Court's infamous decision in
Buck v. Bell.
CONCLUSION

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's
decision in Buck v. Bell. In the intervening half century, it has become apparent that the decision was incorrect on its facts, was based
on now discredited scientific theories, relied upon inaccurate analogies,
applied inappropriate constitutional standards, and was in conflict with
many philosophical principles of the American governmental system.
The opinion has resulted in numerous cases which rise to previously
unattained heights of unfairness and tyrannical governmental authority in applying Justice Holmes' precepts or which seek to avoid
the Buck v. Bell holding by sometimes distorted analysis.
Recently, at least one court has had the courage to criticize the
Buck v. Bell ruling directly. It is time to go much further and to
achieve a complete judicial review of the sentiments expressed by
Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell. In this undertaking, one should heed
the advice of a commentator who observed that "[t]he law is only as
strong as the protection which it gives to its weakest subjects," 270 and
declared that "[r]espect for Mr. Justice Holmes must not prevent the
courts from admitting the fallacious absurdity of his reasoning in
Bell v. Buck [sic]. Our science, our common sense, but most importantly our Constitution demand an end to [compulsory eugenic
sterilization] in the United States." 271
269. 420 F. Supp. at 458.
270. Kindregan, nipra note 4, at 143.
271. Id.
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Too many of our citizens have been denied their right to procreate on the authority of the manifestly deficient judicial precedent
of Buck v. Bell. Our enlightened society cannot allow such atrocities
to continue. Fifty years of Buck v. Bell is enough.

